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Commentary |
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Art of War |
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Regional army command should remain the operational level of war |
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By Pravin Sawhney |
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Given the complexity of wars, it is universally accepted, that success depends on
the excellence in the art and science of war. The science of war deals with strides
made in technology, while the art of war is about doctrine which refers to the
understanding of the three levels at which wars should be fought; the strategic,
operational and tactical. The strategic level of war is responsible for planning
military means to achieve national goals; this level develops war plans and
theatre goals. The operational level of war constructs campaigns to accomplish
theatre goals underscored by the strategic level, and the tactical level deals with
battles and engagements. While the strategic and tactical levels of wars are
easily identified and fought, overall success eventually depends on appreciating
the operational level of war. Given the complex dynamics of war, it is at the
operational level that the commander must keep a cool head regarding the
developing battles. It is his function to figure out how to use even a lost battle to
further his plans, and this is what general-ship is all about.
This of course is easier said. The first commandant of the US Army’s Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General William E. DePuy admitted that the
first doctrine manual called FM-100-5 (operations) written in 1976 dealt entirely
with tactics. The US generals were so impressed and obsessed about their own
superiority in the ‘science of war’ that the ‘art of war’ was completely ignored. It
was the Soviets who excelled in the ‘art of war’. They created the novel offensive
instrument, the operational manoeuvre group (OMG), a divisional strength
formation, which was designed to achieve a significant (even decisive) advantage
on the battlefield by penetrating deep into the opponent’s operational defences.
Success in penetrating the opponent’s vitals has the potential of unravelling his
entire defence. This is the essence of manoeuvre warfare which is the domain of
the operational level commander, who dictates tactical objectives. It needs to be
understood that the opponent’s centre of gravity is not his source of strength,
but his critical vulnerability. Thus, while the operational level commander fights
to manoeuvre in order to hit the opponent’s vulnerability in his depth, the tactical
commander manoeuvres to fight. Once the Soviet war-fighting was debated and
analysed, the US TRADOC came up with the 1986 Army (operations) manual that
gave respectability to the operational art. The new US Army doctrine, ‘AirLand
Battle’ emphasised deep-strike operations into the opponent’s rear areas.
In the Indian context, the operational level of war was first given informal
recognition in late Eighties. It was pegged at the corps level, which is the minimal
level at which joint services operations are undertaken. A reinforced air force
wing is placed in support of each corps. Three reasons were responsible for
deciding this operational level of war. One, until the Eighties, the war-fighting
between India and Pakistan was on a linear battlefield, which itself was not
sophisticated. Since then, there is availability of better RSTA systems; the depth
of a traditional battlefield has increased manifold. Now, there is need for longer-
range artillery as mechanised forces within the two armies have increased, the
linear defences and supporting field works have been heavily reinforced with
concrete fortifications, and there are better tracks (hopefully roads will come
soon) in India’s mountains that have made many mountain guns dispensable.
Both sides have developed capabilities (though modest) for vertical envelopment
and Special Forces operations. Two, lessons were learnt from the 1965 and 1971
wars. The biggest weakness with both armies was that in the absence of the
operational level of war, the strategic level conducted tactical operations. This
meant that the army headquarters bypassed the concerned corps headquarters
and ran divisional battles. Pakistan lost two opportunities in Chhamb, in the 1965
and 1971 wars, as its general headquarters, in excitement and panic, took over
the divisional battles. Similarly, results shown by India’s 10 and 12 divisions
during the 1971 war were unsatisfactory because the army headquarters
attempted to conduct its battles. |
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