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Blissfully Ignorant
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Divisiveness among the various intelligence agencies is only one of the problems |
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Bhashyam Kasturi
Turf battles, personality clashes, politicisation and downright mud-slinging are
some of the phrases one can use to describe the present state of Indian
intelligence agencies. A decade after the Saxena-led Task Force on Intelligence
submitted its report in the aftermath of the Kargil 1999 intrusions and the Rana
Banerji report prepared in 2010-11, after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, India is
still not sure whether it’s intelligence agencies are capable of providing
preventive intelligence. |
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In addition, if such information is indeed provided, then what does the decision
maker do with it? These and many more issues lie at the heart of the present
analysis.
The Task Force for the revamping of the intelligence apparatus headed by Girish Saxena, former chief of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) was set up by the group of ministers by the NDA government under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. At that point, differences emerged between R&AW and the armed forces over the control of the Aviation Research Centre (ARC). The military’s Defence Image Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) which uses satellite imaging to acquire intelligence obviously wanted ARC to supplement its capabilities. This, however, was not to be as R&AW managed to keep ARC! R&AW however lost the Special Services Bureau or SSB, set up in the aftermath of the 1962 border war with China.
The other turf battle was over Technological Intelligence (Techint) as the establishment of National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) meant a dilution in the role of R&AW and Intelligence Bureau (IB) over Techint. That NTRO was established under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is a fact, but controversies have continued to follow the organisation till date, both over staffing and equipment purchases. The turf battles arose due to the recommendation of the KRC that one agency, R&AW, should not have monopoly over multifarious aspects of intelligence access. The Saxena report sought to liberate IB from the clutches of the home ministry so that politicisation could be minimised. This has not happened. And the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), though in place, does not report to the chief of defence staff which remains only on paper.
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