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GUEST COLUMN | Maj. Gen. Sheru Thapliyal (retd)
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Chinese Syndrome
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China has renewed support to the insurgents in the Northeast
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Chinese support for north eastern rebels isn’t a new phenomenon. Following the 1962 Indo-China conflict and facilitated by Pakistani intelligence in Dacca, Kughato Sukhai, the self-proclaimed Naga Prime Minister, wrote to Chinese leader alleging persecution and oppression by India and called on China to honour and follow their principle of safeguarding and upholding the cause of any suppressed nation of Mongolian stock.
In November 1966, China covertly trained and procured weapons for a 300-strong contingent of Naga rebels in support of Maoist revolution. The group returned to India in January 1968 and established a huge camp in the Jotsoma jungles. When Indian forces attacked their haven in June that year, they reportedly recovered Chinese weapons and a trail of documents leading back to Chinese support. China apparently curtailed support for Indian insurgents starting in the late Eighties following Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit to China. However, the Indian military still suspects that the Chinese intelligence agencies continues to support Indian rebels covertly, although until recently, it had little evidence to prove it.
China and Naga Rebels
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was formed in the early
Eighties by Isak Chisi swu, Thuingaleng Muivah and S.S. Khaplang in a sign of
displeasure with the terms of the Shillong Accord, signed by the then Naga
National Council (NCC) with the government of India. Differences |
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later surfaced within the organisation over the issue of initiating dialogue with the Indian Government. As a result, the NSCN split into two factions in 1988: the NSCN-K in honour of its leader Khaplang and the NSCN-IM, led by Isak and Muviah.
The NSCN-IM has a reported sThe NSCN-IM has a reported strength of around 4,500 fighters and is believed to
raise funds primarily through drug-trafficking from Burma and by selling weapons
and others military equipment to other regional insurgent groups. Nagas live in
several states besides their own Nagaland and have fought a six-decade
insurgency for an autonomous ‘Greater Nagaland’ including parts of Manipur,
Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh. An estimated 100,000 people have died in violence
tied to that conflict.A ceasefire with the government has largely held since
1997,but successive rounds of peace talks have yet to produce a lasting result.
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There are several possible motivations for China supporting the NSCM-IM beyond just arms sales. For one, Nagaland straddles Arunachal Pradesh, an area over which both China and India claim sovereignty. For decades, the two militaries have been involved in a cat-and-mouse game along this sensitive border area, each trying to stake a claim along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). By infiltrating into an area of strategic sensitivity to India, China could be aiming to secure a bargaining chip in border negotiation talks. Moreover, China is increasingly wary of India’s rise and larger geo-strategic intentions as a peer competitor. Thus, Naga rebels offer China a convenient counterweight to India’s efforts at consolidating power and governance in northeast India, giving Beijing the ability to frustrate and distract New Delhi as it struggles to rein in the various insurgent groups that have proliferated inside its borders. |
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This is of particular importance now as the two countries continue to try to resolve their border dispute. Since the early Nineties, Beijing and New Delhi have been locked in seemingly intractable border negotiations that have become something of a litmus test for whether the two aspiring powers can cooperate. If the claims of arms sales to the NSCN-IM in return for intelligence gathering of Indian troops turn out to be true, New Delhi can justifiably argue that Beijing isn’t conducting border negotiations in good health.
The scope and scale of Chinese ties with the NSCN-IM should give New Delhi pause as it pursues closer relations with Beijing, because they could imply a willingness on the part of Chinese intelligence to covertly undermine peace negotiation between the NSCN-IM and the Indian government while simultaneously acquiring potentially useful information about Indian troop movements along the Sino-Indian border. |
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© 2012 FORCE ARROWHEAD MEDIA PVT. LTD. All Rights Reserved. |
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