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Sea is the Key
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China’s maritime outlook and growing naval capability
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Admiral Arun Prakash [Retd]
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By Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd)
‘China’s march to the seas will not end with Taiwan. Far larger forces are at work’
— Yoshihara & Holmes
One of the biggest challenges of statecraft is the accurate prediction of a nation’s future intentions;
and history is replete with instances where misperceptions of statesmen have led their countries to
grief. In September 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain loftily predicted, on return from
Munich after his talks with Hitler; “I believe it is peace for our time.” Less than a year later, he
was proved, not only a false-prophet but, utterly naive when Hitler remarked at the outbreak of war:
“Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich.”
Closer home, it was the egregious misreading of China’s intent by our own political leadership which
led to India’s humiliating military defeat in 1962. In this case, however, the few pragmatic voices
which tried to raise an alarm were ignored because of two flawed perceptions that, then, prevailed.
One of them was the, simplistic, belief that
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because India professed a policy of non-violence, it could not possibly have enemies; and the other was the presumptuous notion that India and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) shared a destiny as leaders of Asia.
Of those who offered counsel with regard to China; none was more prescient than India’s home minister
Sardar Patel. Writing, in November 1950, he warned Nehru that the Indian ambassador to Peking, K.M.
Panikkar, had been hoodwinked by the Chinese; thus failing to raise the alarm, about the “disappearance
of Tibet and the expansion of China almost up to our gates”. Patel added ominously: “...even though
we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends”.
A Closed Window
Half a century after the traumatic events of 1962, there continues to be a lack of clarity, in India’s
political and diplomatic circles, about how we should frame policies, and shape our strategic stance
towards the PRC. This ambivalence arises from an inability to interpret the geo-political significance
of China’s actions and statements, in the light of her past, as well as our own, more recent, experiences.
In this context, even those who are sceptical about the recurrence of history need to recall Mark Twain’s
observation that while history may not repeat itself, ‘...it does rhyme.’
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