SPECIAL REPORT
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Ties at Sea
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After the initial smooth sail, the India-US relations have hit turbulent waters
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US secretary of state Hillary Clinton with Indian foreign minister S.M. Krishna,
during her visit to India on 19 July 2011
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Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab
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Six years ago, US secretary of State, Condeleezza Rice had expressed
optimism is an economically rising India. Speaking on Indian soil on 16 March
2005, she had publicly declared to an incredulous audience that the US will help
India become a major power. The bilateral relationship, Washington had hoped
would transform into a defining partnership in Asia where China was emerging
like a colossus. There was instant unease in Beijing, Islamabad, Moscow and New
Delhi. Worried that the US had decided to build India as a counterweight to
China, Beijing decided to further strengthen Pakistan strategically to keep
India locked into the regional box. It, however, did not assess if India was
indeed ready for the new role. This assessment was finally made by another US
secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. Speaking in Chennai on 20 July 2011,
Clinton summed up the US’ exasperation by telling an undecided India that: “It
is time to lead.” The tipping point for the public venting of US’ frustration
was the 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal for the Indian Air
Force.
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On 28 April 2011, the big news splashed in the Indian newspapers was that
the two US contenders, F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft had been down-selected in the
over USD 10 billion MMRCA race. The news was received with disbelief in the US
defence industry, and consternation in the Pentagon and the White House for
different reasons; during his India visit in November 2010, the US President
Barack Obama had pitched in for the US combat platforms with the Indian
leadership. The captains of the US industry had hoped for a
quid pro quo for their backing of the
Indo-US civil nuclear agreement in the US Congress. Defence minister, A.K.
Antony’s reply to them was that India had already purchased US defence equipment
worth USD eight billion dollars in five years, and more would follow. For the US
political leadership, the issue was more than creating jobs back home. Since
1992, when the US had sought military engagement with India, its
mantra had been ‘inter-operability,’
the eventual aim being that the US and Indian forces some-day might fight
together shoulder to shoulder. The US would take-on the larger operational role
in the Asia-Pacific region, with the Indian forces undertaking the lesser role
in its area of responsibility.
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