Homeland Security implies, making India safe from terrorist attacks in the present global scenario of ‘no war-no peace.’ The basic principle on which this system works is total synergy and real-time communications. In wider context, it involves intelligence-sharing between all the agencies involved in controlling access to India’s airports, seaports, land transportation (rail and road) across international borders as well as preventing illegal ingress or egress across our borders by land, sea or air. It further implies, readiness to deal with terrorist sleeper cells, fifth columnists, attempts by terrorists to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), dirty nuclear bombs, sea mines or even a shipload of say, 50,000 tons of common-use ammonium nitrate fertiliser, which transforms into a deadly explosive when mixed with diesel oil.
In the United States, the Homeland Security Organisation is also supported by the local police, the US National Guard and the US National Air Guard as also the armed forces for use in emergent situations. The fact that the US has not witnessed any terrorist attack post 9/11, speaks volumes. India, on the other hand, has become well-known for the numerous terrorist attacks across its hinterland. A look at India’s organisational set-up indicates a rather complex picture, a legacy of our colonial past. The seaports and road transport (including implementation of International Ship and Port Facility Security [ISPS] code for port and ship security) comes under DG Shipping (ministry of shipping and surface transport). Fishing — India has over 3,14,000 fishing boats — is part of the ministry of agriculture. Railways have their own ministry, while the Customs feature under the finance ministry. Ministry of civil aviation controls the civil airports and civilian air traffic while all police, Para-military forces, with the exception of the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) are part of the home ministry. The three armed forces and ICG are under the MOD.
On the seafront, the Coast Guard Act gives powers to the ICG to carry out its ‘sea policeman’s’ role but they have no power to stop and search the merchant ships prior to entering the harbour for explosives or terrorists. They cannot stop unseaworthy ships either. Inside the port, in peacetime the ‘port facility and merchant ship security’ under the ISPS code, rests with the port authorities. Unfortunately, they have neither the capability nor assets to deal with any emergent situation (in the US and Japan it’s under the Coast Guard).
The closest that one comes to synergy is the Unified Andaman and Nicobar Command where the three armed forces and the ICG are placed under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief. Here also, whilst dealing with poachers, a well-integrated programme has to be chalked out between the various forces. This usually involves a co-ordinated move between local civil administration and police, the air force as well as the army. It becomes imperative to get an approval from MoD, as the IAF aircraft or the Army personnel in any anti-poaching missions involve fire-fight and casualties. Given the fact that tri-service integration under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is not yet a reality, expecting major organisational changes between the various ministries is unrealistic. At present, Homeland Security is under the overworked ministry of home affairs (which also deals with natural calamities and civil law and order situations) and the National Security Advisor (who deals with practically all aspects of security).
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