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| July 2010 Issue |
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Shifting Sands
India has been reduced to a strategic co-equal of Pakistan in US calculus
By Brig. Arun Sahgal (retd) |
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India and the US just finished their first strategic dialogue at the secretary of state and foreign minister level from June 2 to June 4 in Washington, DC. The high point in the dialogue was President Obama breaking protocol to attend the reception in honour of the foreign minister S.M. Krishna hosted by the secretary of state Hillary Clinton.
In understanding the dynamics of Indo-US relations, it is important to underscore that there is an increasing realistic appraisal in the US that India is not an ally but has her own strategic autonomy and unlikely to become a ‘camp follower’ of the US like Australia or the UK. Nor would India agree to become a client state like Pakistan. Having realised this important fact there is a growing degree of respect about India’s independent thinking. In this respect, the attempt on both sides is to increase the areas of convergence in thinking and reduce the areas of bilateral divergence and harmonise this important bilateral relationship.
Within the above context the India-US strategic dialogue was more of a broad spectrum discussion rather than being narrowly focused on matters of security or ‘Next Big Idea’ akin to the 123 Agreement. In this respect it stood on an entirely different footing from the recent Pakistan-US strategic dialogue and Washington’s conversations with Kabul. The Indian side discussed cooperation in education, health, agriculture, food security, climate and the environment, science and technology, nuclear and space cooperation, besides defence and counter-terrorism. New Delhi’s talks with Washington about their relationship in the future also differ from Washington and Beijing dialogues. The latter are aimed at engaging Beijing so that the rise of China remains peaceful and becomes a factor for stability in Asia. |
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In the case of India, these concerns are not pertinent for the US which has come to view India as a ‘responsible’ power, besides being the second fastest growing economy. Another, perhaps understated perspective of the dialogue particularly from the US perspective, was to provide sharper focus to the relationship which in the Obama administration had begun to falter particularly in the view of not only Indian strategic and policy establishment but within the US strategic community as well. The process of engagement was sought to be deepened by the Americans with promises of seriously considering India for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. This has been indicated for the first time at the highest political level by the US. Hillary Clinton also noted, the US expects India to ‘embrace its role in regional and global affairs’ and to make economic reforms ‘to foster additional progress’. The former could be a hint at aligning Indian positions with Washington’s. Despite the good tidings and comments, it is important to look at Indo–US strategic cooperation from existential realties and like the folks in electronic media say ‘Ground Zero’.
It would not be out of context to argue from Indian perspective that in the year and a half of Obama administration, the relationship has been marked by what can be termed as ‘strategic cynicism’ which is basically the construct of the Obama administration’s policy formulations on Pakistan and the US inducements to China, essentially to manage its rise and not allow its strategic space in Asia, through global economic and by extension — strategic management.
The US strategic policy formulation in South Asia has seriously impinged on India’s strategic interests and strategic sensitivities. India today stands marginalised in the regional context of South Asia in favour of Pakistan and in the global context by US deference to China. Given the foregoing contextual background, a renewed engagement focus through multidimensional Indo–US Strategic dialogue hardly generates euphoria but at best, a cautious optimism.
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