The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described the Maoist menace as the gravest internal security challenge before the country. Yet, there is total confusion in the ministries of home and defence over handling the situation. As a result, the proposal to involve the armed forces in anti-Naxalite operations has failed to see the light of the day.

“Whether to involve them (armed forces) or how to involve them and what degree to involve them is something that the government is deliberating. It is not a matter of public debate, it is something that the government has to decide,” says minister of state for defence M.M. Pallam Raju.
After the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) shot down the home ministry’s plan of using military expertise in anti-rebel operations, a revised strategy is being planned by the security establishment in North Block with focus on precise intelligence, specialised training, modern equipment and faster mobility for the anti-Naxal forces.

Under the new plan on MHA’s drawing board, a slew of institutional measures, including revised deployment pattern for the BSF, ITBP and CRPF, are on the anvil. Also in the pipeline are plans to pump in more resources into the affected districts to strengthen the security and civil infrastructure. For this, the Planning Commission will be engaged more actively for devising development plans for the troubled zones.

With a firm ‘no’ to the use of army in the fight against Naxalites, the home ministry is mulling roping in ex-servicemen on contract basis for three years and using former Sappers for specific jobs, like de-mining of Naxal-hit areas. The Sappers have professional expertise and sophisticated equipment to locate and defuse IEDs and landmines, some of which may have been planted almost 10 years back. Central para-military forces have no such de-mining personnel men or gadgets to clear the jungles of IEDs and landmines.

“They (Maoists) are also citizens of our country. So when air raids are involved (against Maoists) there is bound to be collateral damage. It is something that needs a very, very responsible decision after considering all factors,” explains Pallam Raju.
However, defence minister A.K. Antony has refuted reports that the Union Cabinet was divided over the issue of bringing in the armed forces to combat Naxal violence.

The armed forces perhaps do not want to be sucked into yet another internal security duty after being already over-stretched in Jammu and Kashmir, the northeastern states and along the unresolved borders with Pakistan and China. They also believe that the presence of army jawans in tribal-dominated areas would only alienate the local population.
With Maoists already gaining the sympathy of the tribal people, the apprehension is that the move to put military boots on the ground could widen the gap between the government and sections of the people in areas where even basic facilities are severely lacking.

Another factor is that any counter-insurgency action by the armed forces could attract greater attention by non-government organisations and other activists, along with the apprehension that the damage to the social fabric could be more serious.
The defence ministry still holds the view that the task of taking on the Naxalites belongs to the State police, which are best equipped in the form of terrain and local conditions. The Maoist insurgency is a low-intensity, guerrilla warfare. Hence, the appropriate security response also has to be low-intensity and local, says the MoD.

The army wants a politician or chief minister to head the unified command, and not a chief secretary or any bureaucrat, for better decision making.

It wants that a brigadier-level officer trained in counter-insurgency be deputed as advisor for planning anti-Naxal operations. This officer should report to the home ministry and not to the state government. Already there is a rethink on the performance of a brigadier who has been attached to the anti-Naxal cell in the MHA.