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| March 2010 Issue |
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Maladies of the West
The US is failing the first critical test of its so-called strategic partnership with India as it wavers in its Afghan policies
By Kanwal Sibal |
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The killing of Indians in another terrorist attack in Kabul on February 26 underlines the mounting dangers for India in Afghanistan. As the West prepares to exit from Afghanistan and strike a deal with the Taliban, India’s vulnerabilities will increase. The ability of Taliban suicide squads to penetrate secure areas of the capital stands proven. The Afghan national security forces are being built up, but will they be able to provide to us on the ground in Afghanistan the level of security required? Kabul cannot be sealed and if large parts of the country are not under firm government control and local intelligence is not available, the ability of terrorist groups to strike unexpectedly cannot be eliminated. Even in India, with better capacities than Afghanistan, not to mention in Pakistan where the authorities have had truck with the groups now targeting their erstwhile patrons and know their working methods, we see the near-impossibility of preventing sporadic terrorist attacks by indoctrinated groups or suicide squads. In a war zone, like in Afghanistan, with insurgent groups fighting the Kabul government as well as the international forces, the motivation to stage terrorist attacks as a form of asymmetric warfare is powerful.
What makes the situation more perilous for India is decision of the West to make peace with the very forces that are responsible for the latest killing of Indians in Kabul. Despite assuring statements that the US has no intention to abandon Afghanistan and will be there for the long haul, the decisions being taken suggest the contrary. When the US political leaders and military generals say that the war in Afghanistan is unwinnable and that a purely military solution not being possible, a political solution has to be sought, it means that they do not see the political consolidation of the existing, legitimate Afghan government as a route for exit. |
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Negotiations with those behind the insurgency and terrorism, that is, the various Taliban groups, is considered necessary. Naturally, negotiating with these groups from a position of weakness will not yield an honourable exit from Afghanistan. Which is why the US Administration has sent in an additional 30,000 troops, with a further 10,000 troops to be contributed by allies. This, the US believes, will give them the means to put military pressure on Taliban strongholds, eliminate the insurgents from key areas, hold them with the help of trained and expanded Afghan forces, provide proper civilian administration there, undertake development activities, thereby winning the confidence ofthe local population and in the process, reducing the base of the Taliban within the country. The operation in Marjah in the Helmand province is supposed to demonstrate the viability of this strategy and the calculation is that its success will have a demonstration effect all over the country. With such operations replicated in other parts of the country, and simultaneously building up local Afghan military and police capabilities in the coming months, the ground would have been prepared for negotiations with the Taliban leadership confronted with the reality of its declining writ within Afghanistan. |
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