Explosives are aplenty including fertilizers, chemicals, loot from road construction detachments. Media and propaganda is well handled. Political patronage is ambiguous; needs ascertaining by intelligence agencies.

Army deployment is presently ruled out but what of the future? Is the Maoist insurgency exploitable by forces inimical to India? They will be fools not to capitalise on this readymade asymmetric battlefield. How fruitful to facilitate its blooming into a mini-Afghanistan, tie down military in the hinterland and cap our economic progress! Maoists, it must be assumed, also follow an externally manipulated agenda. ULFA bases/camps on Chinese soil have been reported in media and Chinese-origin weapons find their way into Maoists hands. Role of Pakistan’s ISI/LeT in arming, funding and training of Maoists is not difficult to judge. Presently, we have an India-friendly regime in Bangladesh but existence of terrorist training camps in Bangladesh with SSG/al Qaeda instructors were reported earlier. Global terror industry has linkages that keep getting stronger.

Strategy

We need ‘synergised simultaneous operations on the socio-political-economic-moral-physical planes rallying local population against Maoists organisation/activities, destroying insurgents while blending development and education to ensure legitimate government rule’. This implies: One, military solution is not the key — aim peace treaty followed by political solution. Two, population is main objective — wean them away from insurgents. Three, rallying local population requires ensuring their full protection. Four, forces need to fight simultaneously at moral and physical levels providing security/assistance to population and destroying insurgents. Five, combat threats to strengthen legitimate rule of law to alleviate pressures that lead to instability and Six, blend development and education with combat operations to win over population.

We need to crystallise top down driven command and control structures ensuring unity of command with strategy/policy executed by career specialists. Unified HQ (UHQ) at state and district levels are required combining command and intelligence functions, integrating PMF/CPO/Police units, government and civil entities trained, dedicated and resourced to establish security, development and rule of law. An effective CI Grid (CIG) is needed delineating areas of operational responsibility to PMF/CPO/Police units synonymous with ground requirements, not necessarily same as State/District boundaries. PMF/CPO/Police units require reorientation, retraining, modernising and equipping. Effective intelligence domination through collection, analyses and exploitation derived from local knowledge/operational area needs optimisation. Proactive intelligence-led surgical special operations to target armed leadership/organisation are needed. Same would apply to psychological and media operations. Grouping villages to ensure proper protection to population should be examined and appropriate policy for surrenders announced. Most importantly, a holistic development plan needs to be drawn and executed diligently.

Operations

CI environment requires operating norms. Flouting them has adverse ramifications and avoidable casualties. These are, one, fight the guerrilla like a guerilla. Two, win hearts and minds (WHAM) of population — project human face, protect locals, avoid collateral damage and indiscriminate force. Three, acquire intimate knowledge of terrain. Four, establish effective intelligence grid. Five, acquire language proficiency/interpreters. Six, understand implications of ‘kills’ versus ‘peace in AOR’. Seven, move tactically and cross country. Eight, avoid roads/tracks unless Road Opening Party (ROP) in position and mine proofing done. Nine, ensure flank protection and dominate high ground during move. Ten, ensure layered early warning system even during halts. Eleven, follow buddy system. Twelve, rehearse day/night reinforcements periodically. Thirteen, ensure Leader-Led contact. Fourteen, sustained operationally oriented training. Fifteen, train leaders at all levels — lead from front.

Incidents like Dantewada show lack of integration/coordination within PMF/CPO/Police, poor combat drills, poor intelligence, inadequate/no pre-induction/CI training. Army does not induct even Special Forces into CI operations without pre-induction training. PMF/CPO/Police have little/no anti-mine/IED training. Their combat performance, especially CRPF in comparison to AR/RR is poor. CPO cadre officers resent IPS officers with little/no CI experience holding senior positions in CPO units. Poor equipping, lack of moderniation, selection and employment pattern, faulty deployment, command and control and poor logistics have all contributed to this state. No effort to recover lost weapons including 81 mm mortars shows lack of morale and poor ethos.