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GUEST COLUMN |
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Citizen Soldiers
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Coordinated state police moves are imperative for tackling
terrorism in India |
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By Radhavinod Raju |
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An international study by Rand Corporation titled ‘How Terrorist Groups End:
Implications for countering al Qaida’ has shown that they rarely end as a result
of winning or losing a military campaign. According to the study, which looked
at a period covering 38 years from 1968 to 2006, and covered 648 terrorist
groups that were active in different parts of the world, most groups ended not
because of military victories of the governments concerned over them, but
because of operations carried out by local police or intelligence agencies
against them, or their joining the political process through a negotiation
process.
This study was done by Rand in the context of the military campaign of the
United States against al Qaeda, on the premise that the US cannot conduct an
effective counter-terrorism campaign without understanding how such conflicts
end in the first place. This study is reportedly the first such systematic study
on how terrorist groups end. The study found that out of the 648 groups that had
taken to terror in this period, 268 ended during this period covering 38 years,
136 groups splintered and 244 continued to remain active.
The study showed that of those that ended, 40 per cent had been penetrated and
eliminated by the local police and intelligence agencies, while 43 per cent
reached a peaceful accommodation with their governments. 10 per cent of the
groups ended after attaining victory in their campaign, while only seven per
cent ended because of military victories of the governments over the terrorist
groups. Military victories became possible only when the groups were large,
well-armed and well organised. The victory of the Sri Lankan Army over the
large, well-organised and well-armed group, the LTTE, in May, 2009, is a case in
point. The fact that the study was completed in 2006, while the LTTE was
militarily eliminated only in May 2009, buttresses the arguments in the study.
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In our own case, there were several groups which had raised the banner of
revolt, taking to arms and terror. The Naxal movement in Kerala is a glaring
case. This movement which started in the late Sixties was effectively crippled
by local police action. The economic opportunities that the Gulf opened up
ensured that the movement did not escalate in Kerala. Sikh terrorism was
effectively subdued in the Punjab due to Punjab police action, by penetrating
the militant ranks and eliminating them. Not very well known is the effective
tackling of the al Fatah movement in Kashmir in the early Seventies by the
Kashmir police, by penetrating the movement, and bringing a number of the
disgruntled youth into the mainstream. We unfortunately do not go back to our
old lessons, or undertake studies similar to the one done by Rand, which would
help governments in adopting the correct policies in handling such situations.
India has been a victim of terrorism sponsored by hostile neighbourhoods for
several decades. However, till the early Nineties, terrorism was confined to
specific regions, like the Northeast, Punjab or Jammu & Kashmir. Till then, we
had also shown our capabilities to tackle the problem using State power
represented by its security and intelligence agencies, the genuine political
space available to all Indian citizens for political expression, and India’s
economic opportunities.
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January 2012
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