A peace initiative between India and Pakistan is like a loaded gun: the side that learns how to use it best can inflict damage upon the other. Ever since the multi-issue composite dialogue commenced in 1997, Pakistan has used it to escape retribution for major acts of aggression. The latest example of this stalling tactic is its keenness for talks post 26/11, after the unexpected capture of Ajmal Kasab discredited its argument that the terrorist attacks had been conducted by Indian nationals.

Kasab’s interrogation, followed by that of David Headley, has demolished the first two layers of deniability that traditionally surround Pakistan’s proxy war: that terrorist attacks within India do not originate from its territory, and that if they do, they are the work of non-state actors. The third and final layer however, remains intact: it holds that even if Pakistani state officials are involved in acts of cross-border terrorism, they are rogue operatives. Their actions do not reflect state policy.

Indian analysts do not buy this latter argument. However, it has been prominently entertained by the governments of the United States and United Kingdom. Both countries have commiserated with India and lauded its restraint, while simultaneously bailing out Islamabad from its post Mumbai diplomatic isolation. Their strategic manoeuvres have reached a stage which needs countering, lest they inadvertently encourage further transgression from Pakistan.

Dubious Allies

Washington and London are pressing for Indo-Pakistani dialogue because their security agendas diverge from that of New Delhi. In their assessment, Lashkar-e-Toiba is a group primarily focused on targeting India and only posing an incidental threat to Western interests. Consequently, they are more concerned about domestic terrorist cells with links to Pakistan. Disrupting these requires working closely with Pakistani intelligence, and overlooking its actions vis-à-vis India.

Divergent counterterrorist agendas however, are only part of the story. They explain why the US and UK have not pressed Pakistan to move beyond cosmetic action against LeT, but not why they are keen for a resumption of dialogue. The latter question can be answered with reference to NATO’s search for an exit strategy from Afghanistan, which has gathered momentum under the Obama presidency. Basically, India is being made to pick up the tab for Anglo-American war fatigue.
The logic goes like this: NATO wants to leave Afghanistan in an orderly manner, with a stable government in Kabul that would prevent al Qaeda from regrouping within the country. It needs the Pakistani army to satisfy both conditions, by suppressing ‘extremist’ Taliban and brokering a peace deal with ‘moderate’ ones. Tensions along the Indo-Pakistani border are seen as distracting Islamabad from servicing this agenda. Hence, pressure is being put on India to resume talks.

Pakistan has sensed American desperation. It is demanding that the composite dialogue be formally resumed, which would mean introducing Kashmir into discussions that would otherwise focus specifically on the 26/11 attacks. In effect, Islamabad wants the uncomfortable revelations of Kasab and Headley to be given a quiet burial.

The US and UK governments have attempted to sell New Delhi onto this course of action by suggesting that a symbolic resumption of Indo-Pakistani dialogue would not harm Indian interests. Ground realities in South Asia would remain unchanged and the Indian government would earn goodwill and support in its quest for a larger international role (this last being an attempt at flattery). However, their argument is disconnected from Pakistani assessments of the situation.