In harmony
Why the British defence industry supports the proposed Arms Trade Treaty
By Brinley Salzmann
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When the proposals for the creation of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) first emerged the British Defence Industry was suspicious of what lay behind it, and its potential implications. Some 40 per cent of UK’s annual defence industrial production is for export, which plays a vital role in sustaining its Defence Industry; therefore, the industry would never support anything which it perceived might undermine its ability to export legitimately and responsibly. However, having considered carefully the proposals for the creation of an ATT, the British Defence Industry is fully supportive of the principles behind this, and believes that there could be benefits arising from them.
The current lack of harmonisation between national export control systems is hampering global counter-proliferation efforts to prevent strategic goods and technologies from falling into the ‘wrong hands’. At present we cannot prevent proliferation, but, at best, can merely delay it whilst the customer seeks an alternate supplier elsewhere. This is due to the sheer diversity of national export control policies, systems and procedures in operation around the World. Thus, it does not matter how effective any one nation’s export control system is and we are all dependent on everyone’s. The best way ahead is through greater harmonisation and consistency of policy between the nations — harmonising systems and procedures is not suggested and would seem likely to be impossible — but there is scope to achieve higher minimum international standards at the policy, decision-making level, and the ATT initiative is aimed at achieving just this.
Also an ATT should greatly facilitate the encouragement of governments to adopt more effective national export control systems and procedures, to enforce their commitments under the treaty. This will boost mutual confidence in the export control systems of fellow treaty signatories.
The current systems in operation around the world, together with an increasing tendency towards extra territorial application of national laws, perversely have the effect of increasing the risk of diversion and the illegitimate acquisition of arms. Those who choose to operate outside the law have made their decision and changing national law will not affect this, although it may change the tactics employed. Conversely, legitimate exporters have chosen to abide by the law and governments are obligated to enforce it. The corollary of this is that the greater the regulatory complexity, of which multi-layered extra territoriality is a significant part, the more resources have to be devoted to it by legitimate exporters and by governments. In most cases, this activity involves routine exports as part of a supply chain or to end-users of no concern. The inability to prevent proliferation is increasingly driving governments into introducing extra territorial controls, as it is perceived that they cannot rely on the export controls of other nations. This is a potential legal and bureaucratic nightmare for many firms, now finding themselves subject not just to the regulations of the country where they are based but also those of potentially a number of other nations at the same time. This presents enormous opportunities for deeply damaging (both commercially and politically) jurisdictional conflicts between sovereign nation states. It is not difficult to see, therefore, that excessive focus on these areas of unthreatening activity actually diverts scarce compliance resources in both industry and government from what may be transactions of real concern. In short, the proliferation of different, overlapping, extra territorial export control laws, driven by a lack of confidence in the controls of other countries, threatens global security, not enhances it.
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