Areas of Concern

Surface Combatants: Every military planner seeks security in numbers and there is merit in this reasoning. Having adequate surface combatants is a prerequisite for any sound naval planning. Demands on surface ship availability are increasing. Need to maintain a ship on station in the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy patrol and other additional units for routine tasks elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, definitely stretches the surface combatant’s availability of the navy. With Project 15A (Kolkatta Class), Project 17 (Shivalik Class), Project 28A (ASW Corvette) and Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) all running well behind schedule, the strain on the balance force level must be heavy. Post 26/11, coastal and offshore security scenario has also come into limelight with greater involvement of the navy and the coast guard. This further stretches resources with little room for adjustment due to paucity of numbers. Ideally, the IN needs over 30 frigates and destroyers. This figure is likely to remain a pipe dream given the regular slippages in all indigenous ship construction projects. Somehow, our defence PSU yards are not able to match the timelines of the other leading warship building nations such as the US, Germany, France, Japan, Korea, Russia, Spain and Italy, to name a few. Our indigenous yards should be able to deliver a minimum of three capital ships annually. Unless we achieve this, the navy will find itself stretched a bit thin on the ground. Situation may improve by 2020, provided the current pressure to deliver is maintained on the PSU yards and repeat orders are placed on time.

Submarine Force Levels: An ageing submarine fleet, coupled with slippages in the Scorpene project poses the gravest challenge to the underwater capability of our navy. Despite repeated alarms by the naval staff about depleting force levels, there has been poor appreciation of the developing situation by the higher decision makers. This has placed the navy in an extremely vulnerable position on the submarine front. The only option available at this stage is to immediately select a vendor for Project 75 (I) and start a second submarine construction line at Pipavav or L&T shipyard. This would help bring the private sector in to warship construction. There is no way that Mazagon Docks (MDL) can simultaneously take on construction of two major surface combatants (P 15B and17 A) and two different classes of submarines, (Scorpene and P-75[I]). If we do not take note of the demonstrated performance of our yards, we are likely to be saddled with critical slippages in our desired capability plan. Submarine construction needs to be streamlined at MDL and the selected private yard till figures as approved by the CCS in the 30 years submarine plan are achieved. Follow on production should be sustained to achieve desired force levels. If concerted efforts are made now and all related actions as per DPP completed, it may be possible to look at 2020 as a good year when submarine holdings may begin an upward journey.

LRMP Aircraft: Surveillance constitutes the most important aspect of any military operations — more so for the navy in view of the vast expanse of the oceans that need to be covered. In navy’s context, this is best done by air assets. For the IN, the silver lining is the planned acquisition of the P-8(I) Boeing LRMP aircraft. If all goes as per schedule, the navy could have all P-8(I) in its inventory and operationally deployed in the next four to six years. Till this happens , the navy will have to rely on its old work horse, the IL-38s which have served the navy well despite their age and poor supportability by the Russians — even after modernisation. A repeat order for P-8(I) Mk-II may be in order till desired holding of at least 15 to 20 is achieved.