At the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Technology Day Awards function in May 2010, DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat faulted the Services for falling to the temptation of inducting the latest weaponry into the defence services from abroad. “DRDO has long been held responsible for the level of self-reliance in defence systems, but it must be understood that the responsibility for self-reliance should be shared by all stakeholders of the ministry of defence and cannot be placed on DRDO alone, which neither has the power to impose its products on its customer nor the mandate or capacity to produce the developed systems all by themselves,” he added. Further, he reminded the armed forces that they too have a role to play in the economic and industrial growth of the country.

Although the past record of DRDO has been a saga of exaggerated claims, unfulfilled promises, inexplicable delays and sub-optimal products, Saraswat’s remarks deserve scrutiny as they reveal an interesting penchant for disowning all responsibility for failures. He is of the view that all stake holders should be held answerable for the current state of poor self-reliance. DRDO expects the Services to live with critical equipment gaps in the hope that one day DRDO would be able to develop them. If that be so, the army should have shown its support for self reliance by continuing with T-55 tanks of Sixties vintage to date as MBT Arjun was under development by DRDO. It is another matter that MBT Arjun was sanctioned in 1972 and the original completion date was 1984 — the project has been delayed by whopping 26 years.

The case of Weapon Locating Radars (WLR) needs to be recalled here. DRDO scuttled its import in 1997, promising indigenous development in two years time. Hapless army suffered huge casualties due to its inability to neutralise Pakistani guns in the Kargil war. And, DRDO must be considering loss of a few hundred lives to be a small price in India’s quest for self-reliance. Incidentally, indigenous WLR are still awaited and India had to resort to their import in 2003.

Role of DRDO

In the above mentioned address, Saraswat has lamented that DRDO did not have the power to impose its products on its customer. In other words, DRDO feels aggrieved that it cannot force the armed forces to buy equipment produced by it, even if it is sub-standard, of outdated technology and unfit for induction. Perhaps, the armed forces are expected to contribute to self-reliance by accepting whatever sub-optimal equipment is produced by DRDO. It is a strange logic. There is not a single country in the world wherein R&D setup can decide what is good for the armed forces and have the power to force them to accept its products without protest.

DRDO’s vision statement is to ‘provide our defence services decisive edge by equipping them with internationally competitive systems and solutions’. Further, their stated mission is to ‘design, develop and lead to production state-of-the-art sensors, weapon systems, platforms and allied equipment for our defence services’. One wonders as to whether DRDO ever carries out an appraisal of its own performance. Its record is inexcusable and abysmal. It cannot boast of a single state-of-the art system developed by it. Finding alibi for own incompetence and failure does not augur well for an organisation. Inability to detect and accept its own short-comings makes an organisation complacent and resistant to reforms. The fundamental reason for the failure of DRDO to deliver is this virus of self-delusion that afflicts it.

DRDO has consumed thousands of crores of rupees over the last few decades. Therefore, shortage of funds cannot be touted as an excuse for non-performance. There has been a progressive increase in the quantum of funds allotted, as shown below:
a) Year 2007-2008 – Rs 6256 crores
b) Year 2008-2009 – Rs 7737 crores
c) Year 2009-2010 – Rs 8317 crores
d) Year 2010-2011 – Rs 9809 crores