A high level Russian defence delegation led by defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov accomplished quite a bit in a day’s visit to New Delhi on September 29. Serdyukov attended the ninth meeting of the Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) with his Indian counterpart, A.K. Antony; visited the BrahMos Aerospace complex; held a joint press conference; had the United Aircraft Corporation chief, Alexey Federov explain separately to the Indian media why MiG-35 aircraft was poised to win the Indian Air Force 126 MRCA contract, and before one could take a deep breath to understand what had happened, he boarded the plane back to Moscow and was gone. The question that was left unanswered is if Russia can prepare well for important meetings, why it cannot deliver just as smoothly.

In concrete terms, the term of the IRIGC-MTC was extended by another 10 years to 2020, an apex body under the defence secretary and his Russian counterpart was announced to oversee the working (read, not properly working) of various joint working groups and sub-working groups between the two sides, a new joint working group for development of the hypersonic version of BrahMos missile was announced, the status of Forces Agreement for more joint military exercises was reviewed, and plenty of in-camera talks for sorting out umpteen bilateral problems regarding Russian acquisitions was done. The latter included the pricing and delivery of Admiral Gorshkov, delivery and transfer of technology of T-90S tanks, acquisition of 80 Mi-17V1 helicopters, delay in contract of 40 Su-30MKI, acquisition of three frigates, design and development of 5th generation aircraft, status of Military Transport Aircraft, to name a few high ticket items. The irony of the bilateral relationship that delivers fitfully and still progresses is immense and can be traced back to Moscow’s good luck.

A Russian official travelling with Serdyukov told FORCE that Russia would certainly have denied the sale of Su-30 aircraft, the leasing of nuclear powered Akula submarine, and the BrahMos joint venture to India if 10 years ago it had the money that it has today. These were sales under financial duress. However, as it turned out, today these three contracts shine as the centre-piece of an unusual bilateral cooperation, and show Moscow as a reliable partner. How reliable has Russian equipment sales been is too well documented: product support has been poor, delivery of spares and important assemblies have been caught up in Russian government wrangling where India cannot deal directly with OEMs, prices have been jacked up mid-way through a work, contracts are signed piecemeal leaving room for legal manipulations, attempts at old equipment being passed off as new have been made, and assurances given by the top leadership are not implemented down the line. Probably, the good things favouring Russia are: its affordable weapon platforms for India where quality can never supersede quantity, the Indian armed forces being used to rugged platforms, and for historical reasons, no one across the Indian political spectrum has ever accused Moscow of wrong-doings. Indian officials acknowledge the help provided by Moscow during the 1999 Kargil war, when plane loads of spares and ammunition were despatched fast to meet Indian needs, and that Moscow continues to respect New Delhi’s sensitivities regarding sales of its equipment to Pakistan.

What should worry Moscow is that all this could change if things do not improve. There are two reasons for defence relations turning lukewarm. One, India today has the money to buy state of the art equipment with reliable product support from others sources. In any case, the Russian equipment is not the best. For example, there are reports that the Russian defence ministry is itself considering buying UAVs from Israel. And two, as part of the bilateral Defence Framework, the US is pushing aggressively for its arms sales to Indian defence forces. Considering that the nuclear deal is now a foregone conclusion, the possibilities of defence high-technology transfers from the US have brightened. A senior official of a leading US defence company told FORCE rather wisely that ‘India will not be able to match up with Chinese defence technology without US assistance.’ This is something that Moscow should consider seriously. At present, half of Russian defence sales worldwide are to India. This could well change by 2020 if things continue to drift. President Dmitry Medvedev would do well to ponder over this before he comes on his maiden visit to India later this year.