Speaking recently in New Delhi, foreign secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon said that
“With China it is not a border dispute but a boundary dispute which is peaceful.
We (India) have our perceptions and they (China) have their own perceptions on
the boundary and incursions into each other’s territories. The important thing
is whether or not there is a change in the pattern of incursions to suggest that
China is trying to alter the status quo.” The foreign secretary is being less
than truthful. Indian patrols stay well inside Indian territories, ranging from
two to 20km from the McMahon Line. This is because India’s Patrolling Limit
Policy (PLP) formulated in 1975 by the China Study Group under Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi’s leadership has never been reviewed. Worse, the Indo-Tibetan
Border Police force (ITBP) that forms the first line of defence on the LAC has
instructions to not enter into any altercation with the PLA patrols (as large as
300 to 400 men) even when they move freely inside Indian territory. This had led
to the DG, ITBP V.K. Joshi’s media outburst in May 2007 about increased PLA
intrusions into India. This is not all. Arunachal Pradesh Member of Parliament,
Kiran Rijiju told FORCE (May 2008) that: “In 2005, when I first raised the issue
of Chinese incursions in Arunachal Pradesh, the government simply dismissed my
assertions. I raised the issue again in 2006 and the government flatly denied
that any incursions have taken place.” Once it became impossible to dismiss
PLA’s deep incursions, New Delhi took the line, as repeated by Menon that
incursions happen from both sides.
Considering that regular PLA incursions started in 2000 as a consequence of
India’s 1998 nuclear test and the 1999 Kargil war (many PLA officers visited
Pakistan during this time to help in operational logistics), the Vajpayee
government did not fare any better. It also publicly denied PLA territorial
transgressions. India’s defence minister from 1998 to 2004, George Fernandes
told FORCE (May 2008) that, “I do not think India has ever, including now, taken
what China is doing or can do to our national security very seriously.” This is
true, with an exception. Indira Gandhi was the only Prime Minister who
understood that for any meaningful interaction with China, credible military
muscle should back diplomacy. This is because the PLA remains an important
component of Chinese highest decision-making bodies. For example, in the
Sixties, Chinese foreign minister, Marshal Chen Yi said after China demonstrated
its capability to make nuclear weapons: “Without the bomb, I cannot be firm at
the negotiating tables.”
Chinese detest appeasement and see it as a sign of weakness. For these reasons,
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1980 ordered Operation Falcon under the army
chief, General K.V. Krishna Rao. Learning the lessons from the 1962 war, it
envisaged converting the patchy forward presence against China into a heavy
forward deployment on the arc from Turtok (Ladakh) and Shyok, all the way to the
India-Tibet-Myanmar tri-junction. Arunachal Pradesh, North Sikkim and the
Trans-Ladakh range were to get special attention. The heavy deployment would be
undertaken over a 15 years period in which forward build-up would keep pace with
infrastructure development along with viable lines of communication for
operational logistics. Moreover, she set up the China Study Group in 1975 to
review situation on the China border. Despite strong protests from China,
Sikkim, with the passage of the 38th Amendment bill in Parliament on 23 April
1975, became the 22nd state of the Union of India. Indira Gandhi’s firm handling
of events which led to the creation of Bangladesh and the merger of Sikkim with
India were not lost on the Chinese leadership. Chinese Vice-President Deng
Xiaoping offered a settlement of the border in June 1980 on similar lines as the
1960 Zhou package. Unfortunately, Indira Gandhi did not live long enough to
travel to China. Her assassination was a setback to India-China relations, and
thereafter, New Delhi has always stuck to an appeasement policy towards China.
There is an unsaid political apprehension that India may not be able to handle a
two-front confrontation, with Pakistan and China. The military leadership’s
strategy has never been fully appreciated by the political masters. It is
‘strategic defence and operational level offence (s)’ against Pakistan, and
‘full strategic defence with tactical offensive capability’ for China, where the
emphasis is on excellent border management. Thus, the key against China is to
have formidable border management, and to build deterrence capabilities.
It took three Indian Prime Ministers to demolish Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s
commendable work started on border management against China. When Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi visited China in December 1988, he was still holding strong cards.
India’s border management under Operation Falcon was better than China’s, India
had handled the 1986 Sumdorong Chu crisis firmly, and despite the Bofors scandal
setback, Rajiv Gandhi had 413 Congress MPs in the Lok Sabha. Yet, he did not
bring up the border issue in his meeting with the Supreme Chinese leader, Deng
Xiaoping. K. Natwar Singh, who travelled with the Prime Minister, confirms in
his recent book titled ‘My China Diary, 1956-88’ that:
‘Neither Deng Xiaoping nor Rajiv Gandhi wasted time on details. Neither of them
mentioned the boundary dispute at their meeting. This, the PM (Rajiv Gandhi) was
to discuss with Li Peng (Chinese Prime Minister) and to the lesser extent with
Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang.’
Li Peng, instead gave a dramatic twist to the issue by saying it needed ‘mutual
understanding’. ‘If the boundary had been delimited or demarked, no
accommodation on territory could be possible,’ Li Peng said. Natwar Singh writes
that Rajiv Gandhi’s visit was a success. (However, President K.R. Narayanan,
India’s first ambassador to China after diplomatic relations were mutually
restored in 1976, the first chairman of the China Study Group in 1975, and the
minister of state for external affairs during the 1986 Sumdorong Chu crisis, did
not think so and he brought up the boundary issue during his official visit to
China in May 2000. His Chinese counterpart, President Jiang Zemin told him that
“time and patience are needed to overcome problems left over by history”). On
his return from the China visit, Rajiv Gandhi ordered Operation Falcon to be put
on hold to demonstrate India’s goodwill towards China. China did just the
opposite. The PLA ordered building of infrastructure in Tibet Autonomous Area
(TAR) and strengthening of border management.
With time, as China rose in stature, India bent over backwards. A retired
foreign secretary told FORCE that, “there is always pressure within the
establishment to show all Prime Ministers’ visits to China as a grand success.”
Once P.V. Narasimha Rao became Prime Minister, he signed the 1993 Border Peace
and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA), and ordered abandonment of Operation Falcon.
Consequent to the 1993 BPTA, both sides agreed to call the entire 4,056km border
as the LAC (which by definition can be altered by force); technically speaking,
the McMahon line does not exist any longer. China had never accepted the
British-drawn McMahon line that New Delhi referred to as the traditional border.
The Nineties also witnessed massive defence cuts. Always on a low defence budget
priority, funds for the eastern sector against China dried up further.
Thus, when Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee visited China in June 2003 after
Narasimha Rao’s visit a decade ago, India’s border management was in shambles,
little military acquisitions had been made for the Chinese front since 1988,
PLA’s incursions into India had increased manifold (India’s defence minister
George Fernandes after a spot assessment in October 2000, had dismissed repeated
charges made by the then chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Mukut Mithi, that
China has made deep incursions into his state territory). On the other hand,
China had developed an awesome infrastructure in TAR with formidable border
management. Under such circumstances, Vajpayee could make his first non-Congress
PM visit to China a success only by giving more. The Indian Prime Minister
formally acknowledged that Tibet was a part of China with getting nothing in
return. His request for appointing special political representatives for border
resolution was accepted readily by the Chinese leadership. Beijing knew that
there was little need for it, or pressure on it to expedite the border
resolution. It was now Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s turn to visit China in
January 2008. Both sides agreed that there is enough space for them to grow in
the world, both resolved to make the mutual trade reach USD 40 billion soon,
both sides shared similar views on climate change, and the Indian Prime Minister
was relieved when the Chinese told him that they desired peace and stability.
There was no mention of hastening the border resolution, and nothing formally on
Sikkim being a part of India. On his return, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
visited Itanagar, the capital of Arunachal Pradesh, and China formally lodged
its protests. For quite some time before, the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi
had repeatedly laid China’s claim on the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which they
call ‘lower Tibet.’
If the PLA is not moving into ‘lower Tibet’ and simply testing India’s weak
resolve and decrepit military preparedness on the LAC, there is a reason for it.
The Dalai Lama stands between China and ‘lower Tibet.’ His global stature since
1959 when he fled Tibet and sought refuge in India has grown in inverse
proportion to the impregnability of the Himalayas in the Sixties. (The PLA had
declared a unilateral ceasefire in the 1962 war without reaching the plains of
Tezpur in Assam as it was worried about its’ stretched operational logistics.
Today, the PLA has enormous airlift capabilities, and runs a train service into
TAR, the highest plateau on earth.) New Delhi has not grasped this reality. Its
position in August 2008, when the Olympics torch arrived for its Delhi leg that
the Dalai Lama should not indulge in any political activity, remains frozen in
time. This was New Delhi’s position in 1959 as well. A former foreign secretary,
Kanwal Sibal, writing in FORCE (May 2008) said that, “India has, in effect, done
great service to China by keeping the Dalai Lama politically in check, inducing
him, through denial of political support, to define his agenda for Tibet around
the sensitivities and limitations of India’s China policy”. With Dalai Lama
already 73 years old, time is running out for New Delhi. The need of the hour is
to focus furtively on improving border management, building infrastructure and
military capabilities for the China front, and continue hoping that the Dalai
Lama survives long enough to provide India the first line of strong defence
against China. |